The present easing on the world oil market could foster the illusion that energy problems are now resolved. During 1981 various oil-producing countries (OPEC and non-OPEC alike) found they had to cut their prices. OPEC production has had to be reduced by about one-third from the 1979 level of 31 mbd 1, Last September's OPEC output of 20 mbd was the lowest monthly figure for 12 years and has by year-end 198i recovered to just 22 mbd. "The OPEC is no longer able to dictate prices; there is more oil than the market can take." These are typical recent comments, but they reflect too short-term and superficial a view. The real issue is the question whether energy supplies are secure in the long term, too, and whether energy itself presents a danger for general economic and political developments. R eference to the risks attached to the future energy supply situation must not be interpreted as pessimism but as realism. The events of the years 1974 to 1978 have taught that energy policy quickly loses momentum in a post-crisis period and many business and private energy-users hesitate to undertake costly investment when they see oil prices falling in real or even nominal terms. This danger grows the longer the lull continues. At the moment there are good reasons to expect that the oil market will remain slack for a number of years. Although it is too early to predict a repetition of the behaviour pattern that followed the first oil crisis, there are signs of a growing dilatory attitude on the energy front. The US, for example, is about to disband its Department of Energy, which was set up only in 1977. In some countries, government programmes for longterm energy research projects and the rationalisation of energy have been cancelled or cut back. (Coal liquefaction projects in the US and in Germany 2, for example, have been drastically reduced.) In most cases, the trimming of public spending on energy is more a question of budget constraints than a matter of judgement, but it does highlight the danger that whenever tension on the world oil markets lessens, long-term energy objectives lose priority to other competing objectives. These remarks should not raise the false impression that anyone involved in international energy policy is eager to have the crises back with us again. On the contrary, the world economy badly needs this breathing space. The task of the lEA 3 and other organisations with an energy policy mandate is to contribute to making good use of this respite. Energy policy should once and for all try to break out of the excessively cyclical development it has been going through during the last eight years. The energy markets must not contribute to 1 Million barrels perday-abbreviated inthetext as mbd. 1 barrel = 159 litres: approximate conversion factor: 1 mbd (for one year) = 50 million tonnes oil equivalent (toe) p.a.; in the energy balances of the lEA Member Countries, an average conversion of 1 mbd = 49.2 mtoe p. a. was taken; 1 mtoe = 1.43 mtce = 10 Petacalories. 3 The International Energy Agency is an autonomous body established in 1974 within the framework of the OECD as a reaction to the first oil crisis. It now numbers 21 of the OECD's Member countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States), i. e. virtually all the Western industrialised nations with the exception of France. It was founded in order to foster energy policy co-operation between these countries, and has the following basic aims: a) The uniform distribution of available oil supplies in the event of a disruption in oil supplies, by means of a special crisis mechanism, and the protection of the Member Countries against the risk of a future interruption of supplies, by maintaining stocks. b) The reduction of oil dependence by improving the energy supply and demand structure within the framework of a programme for longterm co-operation. c) The promotion of co-operation with the oil-producing countries and other oil-consuming countries.
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OIL destabilizing the world economy. Instead, they should become stabilizing factors through long-term planning and implementation of energy investment projects. This calls for long-range time and planning horizons well beyond the end of the next half-period of the business cycle and beyond the next elections.
Although it was possible, after the first oil crisis, to contend that the price shock was a one-time incident in economic history, that belief was badly shaken by the second price shock in 1979/80. Whereas structural change has always persisted in the energy economy, one consistent feature -at least prior to 1973 -was the relatively cheap price of oil and gas. However, 1973 marked the beginning of the age of increasingly costly energy. The realisation that this change has taken place is gradually sinking in, but there is much convincing still to be done before all investment and consumption decision-making takes it into account.
In its cyclical changes, the energy market is often too short-sighted. Short-term price indicators are not reliable guidelines for long-term investment decisions. That can be said without the least implication of a preference for the planned over the market economy system. The Government must be ready to intervene to correct or support the market economy's management of energy supplies, if necessary, so as to smooth out or accelerate the adjustment process. This is the principle on which all governments in the Western industrialised countries -including Germany-have so far operated.
Changes Since 1973
This introduction is in no way intended to play down what has been achieved since 1973. On the contrary, the figures point to major successes in the structural change of minimising the role of oil ("away from oil") in energy production and consumption: [] Energy consumption per unit of real gross national product in the OECD countries fell on average by 12 % between 1973 and 1980. During the same period, total energy consumption increased at the very low rate of 0.5 % per year, the average annual increase in GNP being 2.5 %;
[] In contrast to total energy consumption, which was still steadily climbing, oil consumption fell in absolute terms (from about 1.9 to about 1.7 billion tonnes, i. e. 0.8 % per year) and oil imports fell even more rapidly than did total oil consumption (from 1.32 to 1.16 billion tonnes, or 1.9 % per year); However, these quite dramatic decreases in oil consumption in the last two years are not simply the result of more economic use of energy or recourse to alternative sources of energy. There is another, less desirable, cause as well -namely, slow economic growth. It is impossible to distinguish cyclical from structural effects with scientific accuracy. According to preliminary estimates each factor is responsible for about half of the reduction in oil consumption. This means that if economic activity picks up again then oil consumption will increase at a faster rate, too. It should also be borne in mind that much of what appears to be a structural reduction in oil demand is in part caused by a change in behaviour (e.g., lowering heating temperatures, driving less), and this is reversible if consumers were to anticipate a fall in real oil prices over a number of years. Only that part of structural change which is based on investment can be relied upon to endure. A simple extrapolation of the dramatic success in the last two years is thus not possible. The most profitable energy-saving investments are being made first, and thus decreasing returns are to be expected in the future.
This statistical picture shows that oil is still the backbone of the industrialised countries' energy supply systems and that they have in no way reached a balanced structure. In other words, the structural change so far achieved, however considerable it may be in itself, offers no guarantee that future oil price shocks, and with them new disruptions of the world economy, can be avoided.
As a production factor, energy was elevated to a new economic order of magnitude by the very steep increase in the cost of crude oil over the last eight years, which in turn produced an increase in the cost of competing energy sources. The adverse effects of the first and then
